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Fear of floating has recently come to be seen as one of the central de
facto characteristics of exchange rate regimes in emerging markets,
after first being identified by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). The
interpretation of this phenomenon is still open to question. Does the
optimal monetary regime for emerging markets with open capital
markets entail limited exchange rate flexibility? Is the famous trilemma
of open economies really a dilemma (as formulated by Shambaugh,
2004) for emerging markets—a choice between open capital markets or
monetary freedom with no separate choice of exchange rate policy? Or
is the trilemma alive and well? Does the pervasive fear of floating
indicate instead that many emerging markets inadvisably choose to
limit exchange rate flexibility when a genuine floating regime would be
preferable?
Although the literature on this topic could be classified along many
dimensions, this paper focuses on the extent to which fear of floating is
the optimal policy for emerging markets. The literature can be divided
into works that focus on deriving fear of floating as the optimal ex post
monetary policy, taking into account the particular economic
environment and shocks faced by emerging markets, and works that
focus on the ex ante effects of monetary policy, where anticipation of
exchange rate policy can drive inefficient private sector decisions. The
main factors that are claimed to support fear of floating ex post are the
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pass-through of (excessive) exchange rate volatility into domestic
inflation, the costs to inflation credibility this might entail, and the
contractionary effects of a devaluation on an economy with a high level
of dollarized liabilities. In contrast, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004)
argue that although limited exchange rate flexibility is often the optimal
discretionary policy ex post, it distorts the private sector’s incentives to
insure itself ex ante against sudden stops in capital inflows. If the private
sector anticipates that the exchange rate will be defended during a
crisis, its own incentives to hoard international liquidity are weakened.
Such anticipation can be the ex ante cause of the excessive dollarization
that supposedly validates fear of floating ex post. Fear of floating is not
optimal, but it is the equilibrium policy in the absence of a commitment
to float during crises. Countries can improve their insurance against
sudden stops by giving the private sector the right incentives, either
through a commitment to a floating exchange rate or through various
substitute policies that we discuss later in the paper.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the tension between these
approaches and its implications for exchange rate policy in emerging
markets. We examine the question of whether fear of floating is simply
the optimal policy choice in a difficult environment or a suboptimal
equilibrium with too little exchange rate flexibility during external
crises. We take the view that these explanations are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, in that fear of floating may have different aspects
under different circumstances. In the face of less severe external shocks,
when the supply of international liquidity is not exhausted, countries
will optimally stress the ex post considerations while preferring to avoid
the inflationary effects of exchange rate instability. This does not
preclude that the exchange rate be allowed to float during severe crises,
when international liquidity shortages are binding; the commitment to
this stance ex ante provides maximal insurance against such events.
In this view, while floating exchange rates can have important incentive
effects, the exchange rate does not need to float freely under all
circumstances for these effects to obtain. This leads naturally to the
concept of state contingency. It is impossible to evaluate the
consequences of fear of floating without understanding the
circumstances under which such exchange rate rigidity occurred.
Perhaps the significant unconditional fear of floating that the literature
identifies masks conditional flexibility during external crises.
We develop a simple model that captures a trade off between ex
ante and ex post considerations. The are two states of nature, a “good”
state, during which international liquidity is sufficient, and a “bad”
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state, or crisis, during which constraints on the supply of international
liquidity are binding. The optimal policy with commitment is indeed
state contingent along the lines described above, with policymakers
intervening to stabilize the exchange rate and prevent inflation pass-
through when there is no crisis, but allowing the exchange rate to float
if a potential crisis occurs, for its effect on expectations.1 We also consider
two second-best policy regimes: the discretionary policy, which is
determined ex post with no commitment, and the noncontingent policy
with commitment. As in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), the
discretionary policy will exhibit inefficient fear of floating during crises
and forego the insurance benefits of the floating exchange rate, but it
does not compromise the benefits of exchange rate stability during
normal times. The noncontingent policy with commitment is viewed as
a proxy for the process of building commitment to floating, during which
time it might be necessary to avoid intervention altogether. Although
this brings the benefits of improved ex ante insurance against external
shocks, it also carries short-term costs in the form of the greater inflation
pass-through that floating entails.
To empirically identify state contingency, we develop an indicator
of potential sudden stops as a proxy for the bad state of nature described
above. The indicator is derived from the spread on a broad index of
high-yield debt. A rise in high-yield spreads is treated as a (common)
exogenous negative shock to external financing conditions for emerging
markets and, as such, as a potential sudden stop. We compare the
behavior of the exchange rate regime in periods with and without
external pressure and then classify the state-contingent exchange rate
regime. It is important to emphasize that we evaluate state contingency
with respect to potential sudden stops. This allows us to address the
question of whether the exchange rate regime has an effect on the
likelihood of actual sudden stops, which are treated as endogenous, and
hence to evaluate the insurance provided by floating exchange rates.
Classifying exchange rate regimes according to their behavior during
potential sudden stops reveals that many countries display little
difference in the degree of exchange rate flexibility during potential
crises and other times, and their exchange rate flexibility is uniformly
low. These emerging markets are viewed as operating under a
discretionary exchange regime. Another group of emerging markets
1. Preventing inflation pass-through is not the only ex post channel through
which fear of floating can be justified. We focus on one channel to keep the model
streamlined.
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does not exhibit state contingency because their exchange rate flexibility
is uniformly high. These countries cannot be described as exhibiting
fear of floating, and we interpret these countries as noncontingent
regimes committed to floating. Finally, a few countries do exhibit fully
state-contingent exchange rate flexibility.
After characterizing exchange rate behavior in the face of potential
crises, we then proceed to investigate the extent to which the choice of
regime can be given a normative interpretation. In particular, does
widespread fear of floating during potential crises imply that a
commitment to floating would be beneficial? To answer this question,
we explore insurance substitutes. As discussed in Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2004), sterilization of capital inflows and direct financial
regulation can substitute for the incentives provided by a commitment
to floating. We examine the data, but find little evidence of such
substitute policies. The model suggests that fear of floating should
therefore be associated with underinsurance against liquidity crises.
We test this hypothesis by examining two outcomes, the likelihood of
suffering a sudden stop and the link between the exchange rate regime
and the self-insurance of the private sector. In both cases, we find
evidence that fear of floating matters. Less flexibility during potential
crises is associated with a greater probability of an actual sudden stop.2
More flexible regimes, in turn, lead to greater hoarding of foreign
exchange reserves by the private sector. Finally, we investigate the
determinants of exchange rate regime choices. A key ingredient in the
analysis is the credibility of monetary policymaking. The model suggests
that state-contingent regimes require the most credibility,
noncontingent floating an intermediate level of credibility, and
discretionary policy the lowest level of credibility. The data give some
support to this hypothesis, showing an association between floating
exchange rates and the overall credibility of the monetary policy
framework, as measured by the commitment to inflation targeting.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the
theoretical framework we use to approach the data. Section 2 describes
the data and methodology and provides an outline of the empirical facts.
Section 3 provides a more formal analysis of the time series measures
of exchange rate flexibility. Section 4 examines the consequences of the
choice of exchange rate regime. Section 5 analyzes the determinants of
exchange rate flexibility, and Section 6 concludes.
2. This result is not by construction. Exchange rate regimes are characterized
in relation to potential crises, while the measure of sudden stops is an actual
outcome.
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1. FEAR OF FLOATING: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
As stated above, various models have been proposed in the literature
to explain fear of floating. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggest that fear
of floating can be explained by a monetary policy dilemma trading off
the seigniorage benefits of inflation against the cost of deviating from
an inflation target in an environment with risk premium shocks and a
high pass-through of the exchange rate to the national price level. In
their model, fear of floating is increasing in the size of the risk premium
shocks and the extent to which inflation targeting is valued over
seigniorage. Other authors, such as Aghion, Banerjee, and Bacchetta
(2003), emphasize the balance sheet channel. Most studies in this group
take as given the presence of substantial dollar liabilities that raise the
risk of bankruptcies in the event of a devaluation. However, Céspedes,
Chang, and Velasco (2004) present a model in which the balance sheet
effects of dollarized liabilities do not necessarily overturn the standard
Mundell-Fleming analysis that floating rates are better in the presence
of external real shocks, since floating also has effects on the asset side.
Lahiri and Végh (2001) rationalize fear of floating as the optimal policy
in an environment characterized by an output cost of nominal exchange
rate fluctuations, an output cost of raising interest rates to defend the
currency, and a fixed cost of intervention. The fixed cost generates a
nonlinearity in which fear of floating only arises for large shocks. Despite
deriving fear of floating from different imperfections, for our purpose
these models share the important feature that fear of floating is a
characteristic of the optimal ex post monetary policy.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) offer a different view. Fear of
floating arises in their model out of a time-consistency problem. Although
it is optimal to tighten monetary policy ex post assuming the country
is suffering an international liquidity crisis, such a policy increases
the extent to which firms fail to conserve international liquidity ex
ante. The central monetary policy issue for a country facing such sudden
stops is to make certain that the private sector takes sufficient
precautions to insure itself against such crises. A floating exchange
rate is the optimal policy from an ex ante perspective as it raises the
return to holding international liquidity, leads to increased hoarding of
dollar liquidity, and helps to ameliorate the underinsurance of the
private sector. The difficulty in implementing this policy is that the
floating exchange rate is no longer optimal once a crisis occurs, since
an exchange rate depreciation leads to inflation, and thus the time-
consistent equilibrium entails fear of floating. In developing our
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theoretical model, the central insight we take from this analysis is the
existence of a commitment problem with respect to floating.
The framework that we outline below combines elements from both
approaches to exchange rate flexibility, and we assume that fear of
floating can have a different aspect under different circumstances. In
particular, we assume that there are two states of the world. In the
“good” state, there is no shortage of international liquidity and, hence,
the issue of insurance does not arise. In this case, the government
optimally focuses on the ex post issues. In particular, the excess
volatility of foreign exchange markets creates incentives to limit
exchange rate volatility and prevent its pass-through into domestic
inflation.3 In the “bad” state, a shortage of international liquidity is
binding. The policy should focus on the prevention of, or insurance
against, such crises. In this case, fear of floating is not the optimal
response, taking into account the ex ante effects on the incentives of
the private sector to insure itself.
We examine the choice of exchange rate flexibility under three
different assumptions about the government and its ability to commit.
The discretionary regime is the optimal policy when the government
cannot commit to floating during sudden stops, and so the policy is
determined ex post. Such a policy will be optimal in the “good” state,
but it will contribute to underinsurance during sudden stops in the
“bad” state. The state-contingent regime assumes that the government
can commit to floating during sudden stops but is also free to intervene
in the good state without compromising that commitment. Finally, in
the noncontingent regime, the government can commit to its exchange
rate regime, but the private sector does not observe the state of the
world. The government must therefore choose the same exchange rate
flexibility at all times, since intervention during normal times can
compromise the commitment to floating during crises.
The restriction on feasible policies in the noncontingent regime might
appear ad hoc, as it is not derived endogenously within the model but
simply imposed as an assumption. We consider this regime for several
reasons. First, we think it is a useful approximation to the feasible
floating policy for a country that needs to build credibility for its
commitment to floating. Barro (1986) formally models a similar situation
in the context of building a reputation for inflation credibility. In that
model, the private sector is uncertain about the preferences of the
3. The forward discount bias is often attributed to noise traders. See Frankel
and Froot (1989).
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policymaker and the policymaker takes into account the fact that the
private sector learns about these preferences through his actions. The
equilibrium exhibits periods in which policymakers that are tough on
inflation drive inflation to a very low level to demonstrate this fact
until a reputation is established. We conjecture that a policy of
noncontingent floating can operate in a similar manner when a
reputation for floating during crises has not been established.
Furthermore, this policy regime appears to describe the behavior of
some countries in our empirical investigation, so we are compelled to
consider it as a theoretical possibility.
1.1 A Model
The model draws heavily on the framework of Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2004), postulating an overinvestment problem in the
“bad” state, which is the mirror image of the failure to optimally hoard
sufficient international liquidity as insurance against sudden stops.
Crucially, the extent of overinvestment depends on expectations of
exchange rate policy. The framework is extended by postulating a desire
to limit exchange rate flexibility in the “good” state, when there are no
insurance issues, but the pass-through of exchange rate volatility into
the price level is still a cause for concern. The optimal policy must
resolve the tension between these goals, under different constraints on
the policymaker’s commitment. To simplify the exposition, we present
the model in reduced form without explicitly considering the
microeconomic foundations of the mechanisms through which exchange
rate policy acts.
Consider a three-period economy. At time 0, firms make investment
decisions. At time 1, a crisis may or may not occur that requires
firms to make some reinvestment to maintain the productivity of their
asset. At time 2, the economy consumes its output, which depends on
both the investment at time 0 and the reinvestment at time 1. If a
crisis occurs in period 1, the government faces ex post incentives to
tighten monetary policy to protect itself against inflation, as in the
literature in which fear of floating is optimal, since the insurance
aspects of exchange rate policy are already sunk, but ex ante insurance
concerns are foremost. If no crisis occurs, excess exchange rate
volatility is still undesirable through its effect on prices, and fear of
floating is optimal.
The insurance aspect of monetary policy is that firms’ investment
decisions at time 0 depend on expectations of the exchange rate during
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the crisis. The country is assumed to hold a fixed amount of international
collateral that it can either use to finance investment at time 0 or
hoard as insurance against a crisis at time 1. The exchange rate
determines the price at which international collateral can be traded on
the domestic market at time 1 and thus provides incentives for its
accumulation or usage. A pecuniary externality leads to an
undervaluing of international collateral (relative to the price that
maximizes output at time 2), so firms overinvest at time 0 and conserve
too little international collateral for the possible crisis at time 1.
Monetary policy affects the exchange rate and thus has the power to
correct this mispricing, but to achieve this the government has to commit
to allowing the exchange rate to depreciate during the crisis. This raises
the return to holding international liquidity, lowers the return to
investing, and moves the investment decisions of firms closer to the
output-maximizing level. The time-inconsistency problem arises since
once the crisis occurs, the investment decision is predetermined and
the exchange rate depreciation just raises inflation. This is costly to
the government, so ex post the government prefers to limit exchange
rate flexibility.
The objective function of the government is given by W(Y, ⏐π⏐),
where ⏐π⏐ is the expected absolute inflation rate that prevails in period
1, Y is the expected output of the economy in period 2, Wy > 0, and
W⏐π⏐ < 0.4 The output that is produced in period 2 depends on whether
a crisis occurred. The states of the world in which no crisis occurs
and a crisis occurs are denoted G and B, respectively, and the
probabilities of these states of nature are p and 1 – p, respectively.
The economy produces YG(K) if no crisis occurs and YB(K) if a crisis
occurs, where K is the investment level of the private sector in period
0. The crisis generates a production shock that requires further
investment, and although the productivity of the capital stock is
restored, the country ends up investing more to produce each unit of
output. Thus YG(K) > YB(K).
The inflation rate depends on the government’s monetary policy
via the exchange rate. We formalize monetary policy as a choice
over the flexibility of the exchange rate, F, which in general can
differ across the good and bad states, FG and FB. If the exchange
rate is flexible during the potential crisis, the exchange rate
depreciates and inflation increases. If the government chooses an
4. This objective implies that the government is equally averse to inflation
and deflation. If we hold output (Y) constant, the optimal inflation rate is zero.
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inflexible exchange rate, then depreciation and inflation are limited.
Likewise, we assume that if no crisis occurs, excess exchange rate
volatility would be passed into the price level under a flexible exchange
rate.5 We define the exchange rate, e, as the domestic price of one
unit of international liquidity (dollars), so that larger values
represent depreciations.
ππ = () e  and πe > 0;
ee F = () ,  e
G
F > 0, and eF
B > 0 .
In reduced form,  0
F π>.
The investment decision, K(eB), depends on the (rationally
expected) exchange rate that prevails in period 1, eB , but only in the
event that the crisis occurs. If the crisis does not occur, then firms
do not require any further foreign capital, so the exchange rate in
the good state does not affect the firms’ objective function. Investment
is not under the direct control of the government, although it
determines welfare through output, Y. Consequently, the government
must pursue its monetary policies taking into account the incentive
effect that the exchange rate has on decentralized private sector
investment decisions.
Monetary policy affects the investment decision of firms. Under
the assumptions of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), firms
overinvest (relative to the output-maximizing level at time 2) unless
the exchange rate is allowed to depreciate during crises. If the
exchange rate is flexible in the crisis, investment decreases toward
the output-maximizing level. YB increases, since more international
capital is available during the crisis for reinvestment, and firms do
not take decisions that maximize output owing to an externality
(see Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004, for details). At the same
time, YG declines, since in the absence of a crisis it is optimal to
invest all available international capital in the domestic economy.
Nevertheless, the assumption of an overinvestment problem implies
by definition that the gain in a bad state outweighs the loss in a
5. There is an asymmetry in the shocks in the two states of nature. In the bad
state, a shortage of international capital tends to depreciate the exchange rate if
the government allows it to, so that π is positive and increasing in exchange rate
flexibility F. In the good state, external shocks can lead to appreciation or
depreciation. Although ⏐π⏐ increases with F, the sign depends on the shock in the
good state.
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good state, so that expected output, Y, increases with exchange rate
flexibility in the bad state, FB.
KK e = ()  and  Ke < 0 ;
YK K
G() > 0 , YK K
B() < 0 , but YK K () < 0 .
In reduced form, we can write YG(FB) and YB(FB), where FB is exchange




B < 0, Y
F
B
B > 0, and Y
F
B > 0.








The above analysis demonstrates that the government faces a
tradeoff in choosing exchange rate flexibility, since
Y
F
B > 0 ,
which is beneficial, while
π
F
B > 0 and  π
F
G > 0,
which is undesirable. We will characterize the solution to this problem
under the following three assumptions: the time-consistent discretionary
policy, the optimal noncontingent policy with commitment, and the
optimal state-contingent policy with commitment.
Case 1: The discretionary policy with no
commitment
The time-consistent policy is chosen in period 1, taking investment
decisions and the occurrence (or not) of the crisis as given. The fact
that policy is chosen ex post implies that the government has the option
of carrying out a state-contingent policy. We denote the exchange rate
flexibility chosen in each state as FB and FG, where the index denotes
the fact that the policy is chosen ex post in period 1.




353-398 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:54 362363 Exchange Rate Interventions and Insurance
Once the crisis has occurred, monetary policy has no effect on aggregate
output, which is predetermined by the aggregate capital stock and the
remaining international liquidity. Therefore,
YF
B = 0 ,
and the first-order condition that determines the optimal FB is given in
terms of the marginal costs (MCD
B ) and benefits (MBD





B = () π ππ ,  and
MBD
B = 0 , so that
0 = () WY
B
F
B π ππ , .
The government tightens monetary policy until either
WY π π , () = 0 ,




B = 0 ,
in which case inflation cannot be lowered any further.




The same reasoning implies that the optimal FG satisfies
MC pW Y D
GG
F
G = () π ππ ,  and
MBD
G = 0 , so that
0 = () WY
G
F
G π ππ , .
We obtain identical first-order conditions for the optimal flexibility,
F, in both states. Under the simplifying assumption that the relation
between absolute inflation, ⏐π⏐, and flexibility is the same in both
states, the discretionary policy exhibits no state contingency even
though this is an a priori possibility.
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Case 2: The noncontingent policy with commitment
Under this assumption, the government must commit to the same
degree of exchange rate flexibility whether or not the crisis occurs. We
denote the noncontingent optimal policy as F. The first-order conditions
in terms of the marginal costs and benefits of flexibility are as follows:




F F =− () () + () = () 1 ππ π ππ ππ ππ ,, ,  and




YF =− () () + () = () 1, , , ππ π , so that
WY Y WY YF F ,, ππ π π () = () .
In contrast to case 1, exchange rate flexibility carries both costs
and benefits, since the decision is made ex ante when the incentive
effects of exchange rate policy on expectations and output can be taken
into account. At the margin, the optimal policy will trade off the
insurance benefits of exchange rate flexibility ex ante (which operate
through output) against the inflation costs ex post.
Case 3: The state-contingent policy with commitment
Under this assumption, the degree of flexibility is unconstrained
across states of nature and the government can choose FG and FB
separately. The first-order conditions for this problem differ according
to the state.
In the bad state,




B = () , π  and
MC pW Y C
BB
F
B = () π ππ , , so that
WY Y WY Y F F
B B ,, ππ π π ()= ().
In the good state,
MBC
G = 0  and
MC p W Y C
GG
F
G =− () () 1 π ππ , , so that
0 = () WY
F
B π ππ , .
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During a potential crisis, it is optimal to trade off the insurance
benefits of exchange rate flexibility against the cost of inflation. In other
times, exchange rate flexibility offers no benefits (at the margin), so
the optimal policy only takes into account the costs of inflation. This
implies that the fully optimal policy is indeed state contingent, with
more flexibility during potential crises.
1.2 Comparing the Policy Regimes
The previous section solved the model under several different
assumptions about the policy options of the government. We now need
to rank these choices. The state-contingent policy dominates the
noncontingent policy, which dominates the discretionary policy. The
reason is simply that the set of feasible policies expands with credibility.
The state-contingent policy sets a separate and fully optimal exchange
rate policy for each state of nature, taking into account the ex ante
insurance properties of exchange rate flexibility; as such, it must
dominate any other policy option a fortiori, since every noncontingent
policy is also a contingent policy and since it is always feasible, if
superfluous, to commit to the discretionary policy. Likewise the
discretionary policy implies the same exchange rate flexibility in both
states of nature, so it is a feasible noncontingent policy, and the same
argument applies.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition. For each state of nature, the
figure plots the marginal benefit and marginal cost of exchange rate
flexibility as derived above, as well as the optimal degree of flexibility
at the intersection of these schedules. For the noncontingent and
discretionary regimes, losses in each state of nature relative to the
fully optimal state-contingent policy with commitment are shaded. The
noncontingent policy involves losses in both states of nature, as it entails
too much flexibility in the good state and too little in the bad state. The
discretionary policy is identical to the state-contingent policy in the
good state, since it limits exchange rate flexibility, but it leads to
suboptimal fear of floating in the bad state, since a flexible exchange
rate would be preferable.
The next section examines the data on exchange rate flexibility
through the model developed above and categorizes exchange rate
regimes. We look for evidence of state-contingent flexibility that would
mitigate the welfare implications of the fear of floating that the
literature discusses. At the same time, we examine the outliers
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relative to the fear of floating category. These countries are not
operating state-contingent regimes, but they are distinguished by
their uniformly high level of flexibility.
2. FEAR OF FLOATING, NONCONTINGENT FLOATING, AND
STATE-CONTINGENT FLEXIBILITY
The methodological approach that we adopt to characterize exchange
rate flexibility follows Calvo and Reinhart (2002). However, whereas
Calvo and Reinhart characterize differences in unconditional exchange
rate flexibility across countries relative to the benchmark floaters of
Australia and the Group of Three (G3) countries, we extend this analysis
to investigate whether exchange rate flexibility of emerging market
Figure 1. Contingent, Noncontingent, and Discretionary
Exchange Rate Flexibilitya
a. For each state of nature, the figure plots the marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC) of exchange rate
flexibility, as well as the optimal degree of flexibility at the intersection of these schedules. For the noncontingent
and discretionary regimes, losses in each state of nature relative to the fully optimal state-contingent policy
with commitment are shaded.
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floaters varies over states of nature.6 We do not dispute that fear of
floating characterizes the unconditional exchange rate regime across
emerging markets, but we seek to determine whether this unconditional
measure conceals flexibility with respect to shocks that are important
from an insurance perspective.
The literature on the de facto classification of exchange rate regimes
has burgeoned recently. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) extend the analysis
of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) by developing a de facto classification of
exchange rate regimes, which shows a substantial number of deviations
from the declared de jure regimes. The fear of floating manifests itself
in the misclassification of regimes that de jure float, but de facto are
less flexible. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) develop a similar
index, albeit based on a different classification methodology, and arrive
at the same finding of extensive misclassification. Stambaugh (2004)
constructs an alternative classification scheme. We follow the approach
of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) for two reasons. First, the methodologies
in the papers cited above are suited to the broad classification question
of how to distinguish between fixed and flexible arrangements, whereas
our investigation focuses on the differences within the group of de
jure flexible regimes. Second, we want our results to be comparable
with those reported in Calvo and Reinhart’s paper, which started the
fear-of-floating debate.7
To measure flexibility, we compare movements in exchange rates
with movements in monetary policy instruments that affect the
exchange rate. Examining the exchange rate in isolation is not
informative about exchange rate policy, as it does not take into account
the shocks that monetary policy faces. If the exchange rate is stable,
we do not know whether it was due to policy choices despite shocks or
to a lack of shocks. To deal with this problem, we define a flexible
exchange rate as an exchange rate that is volatile relative to the
6. Germany has a fixed exchange rate as a member of the euro area, and it
previously had limited flexibility under the exchange rate mechanism. Calvo and
Reinhart’s point, however, was that the currencies of the G-3 floated freely against
each other.
7. Furthermore, the question of the correct classification methodology is far
from settled. Different methodologies appear to be suitable for different purposes,
and as Frankel (2003) notes, the correlation among different de facto measures
is actually quite low. We therefore choose the measure that is most suitable for
the questions we wish to address. For example, the correlation between the
Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) and the Levy-Yeyati Sturzenegger (2003) classifications is
0.41, which is not much larger than the 0.33 correlation between the Reinhart-Rogoff
(2004) and the much-maligned de jure classification.
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instruments that could stabilize it. The implicit idea is that the
policymaker faces a choice about how to accommodate a given external
shock: it can be allowed to affect the exchange rate if policy is inactive,
or the exchange rate can be insulated if policy is active. Exchange rate
flexibility is about the relative volatilities of the exchange rate and
instruments, not about the absolute volatility of either in isolation.
We follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in using changes in reserves
and interest rates as measures of the monetary policy instruments
available to the authorities and, hence, as measures of the degree of
intervention. Using these variables is not without problems, however,
and we review some of the issues here.8 We risk errors of omission
and commission in using changes in reserves or interest rates as
measures of intervention, and these potential biases might be more
or less relevant depending on whether the goal is to determine the
within-country state contingency of exchange rate flexibility or to
compare exchange rate regimes across countries. Nevertheless, we
use these measures despite the many qualifications or issues of
interpretation, because they are the best data that we have available
and because they are used in previous studies with which we would
like to compare our results.
Reserves can change for reasons unrelated to intervention, in
particular the accrual of interest and the management of foreign
currency debt. However, since we focus on large movements in
reserves, we are not likely to misclassify an accounting change of
reserves as an intervention because of the magnitude of the changes
on which we focus. We are thus unlikely to be biased toward
measuring too much intervention. On the other hand, reserve
movements can be “hidden,” for example when they involve credit
lines or derivative transactions that are not reported on the balance
sheet. We might miss some of these interventions and then
misclassify regimes as not intervening when in fact they are. This
would not be a problem if our intention was to establish fear of
floating, as it would bias our results toward finding flexibility and
thus make the hypothesis harder to establish. However, since one of
our major goals is to investigate the circumstances in which the
exchange rate regime becomes more flexible, it is possible that our
findings could be explained by a change in the method of intervention
toward “hidden” transactions. This could be a problem for establishing
state contingency both within a country (if the change in the means
8. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) also discuss some of the same issues.
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of intervention is correlated with the shocks we use to measure state
contingency) and across countries (if countries with apparently
flexible regimes are more likely to use “hidden” transactions).
We also face several issues with regard to using interest rates as
measures of foreign exchange intervention. The first is the extent to
which the interest rate is genuinely an instrument of exchange rate
management. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) present much anecdotal
evidence that interest rates in emerging markets are active
instruments of exchange rate management, but Shambaugh (2004)
presents more systematic evidence that interest rate policy is not
uniform across emerging markets, and countries with more flexible
exchange rates have more autonomy in setting their interest rates.
If interest rates are not just tools of exchange rate management, we
risk misclassifying episodes as interventions when they are not. This
would present a problem for the within-country results only to the
extent that the shocks that we use to measure external crises had a
direct effect on the domestic economy, separate from the exchange
rate channel, and interest rate policy responded directly to these
effects. This does not seem a very plausible assumption. The issues
are more serious when we turn to cross-country comparisons, since
the empirical measures of interest rates that are available across
countries are far from uniform, and policy interest rates—which are
the most natural counterpart to the theoretical analysis—are not
always available. Thus the extent to which interest rate policy is
directed toward exchange rate management may vary across
countries, In addition, we may introduce biases related to systematic
differences in the interest rate series we use across countries. If the
extent of misclassification varies systematically with exchange rate
flexibility (for example, if more flexible exchange rates increase the
autonomy of monetary policy, so that the interest rate can be directed
to domestic macroeconomic objectives), then there would be a bias
toward finding fear of floating. This issue is relevant for the results
in Calvo and Reinhart (2002), although they do not discuss it, and it
makes it more difficult for us to establish circumstances in which
exchange rates are flexible.
As in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) we first adopt a relatively
atheoretical approach to exploring the data. To measure exchange
rate volatility, we compute the probability that the monthly
percentage change in the nominal exchange rate is within a given
band. To measure instrument volatility, we examine the movement
of foreign exchange reserves and interest rates. We denote the
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absolute value of the percent change and the absolute value of the
change in variable x by ˆ x and ⏐x⏐, respectively, and xc represents a
critical threshold. We are interested in the probability that the
variables or ⏐x⏐ are less than xc. We follow Calvo and Reinhart
(2002) in considering percent changes for nominal exchange rates
and international reserves (setting xc equal to 2.5 percent), and
absolute changes for nominal and real interest rates (setting xc equal
to 400 basis points). We use bands to measure volatility as they are
less dependent on outliers than are variances, and they are also less
likely to misidentify changes in instruments as interventions because
they focus in big policy changes. We also carry out a more formal
analysis using variances in the next section.
To examine whether flexibility varies when the country faces a
potential sudden stop, we use a measure of high yield spreads (defined
as the difference between Moody’s seasoned Aaa and Baa corporate bond
yields) to capture a source of exogenous financial pressure. Shocks are
measured as the difference between the logarithm of the actual series
and its trend as measured with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. In particular,
we define a period of external pressure as an episode in which either
the shock is one standard deviation above its average or the change in
the actual series is one standard deviation above its average. These two
dimensions imply that we are defining potential crises as periods when
the level or the change in high yield spreads were particularly high.
Consequently, the periods that qualify under this definition are October
1990 to April 1991; October 1998 to March 1999; January 2001;
December 2001 to December 2002; and June 2003.
This variable is intended as an exogenous source of potential
financial pressure. Since we are interested in the preventive
properties of exchange rate regimes, it would not be correct to look
at actual crises. Our goal is to examine exchange rate choices during
episodes in which countries had a choice about whether to pursue a
tight monetary policy or to let the exchange rate depreciate. We
therefore pay careful attention, in our interpretation of the results,
to whether we have excluded all false positives related to actual crises,
when even fixed exchange rates can pass through periods of
turbulence. At any rate, such “false positives” concerning exchange
rate flexibility are more likely to occur in situations combining low
levels of reserves and financial crises, which we already partially
excluding with the sample selection (see below). The index of high
yield spreads (HYS) and the periods identified as potential sudden
stops are illustrated in figure 2.
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Figure 2. The High-Yield-Spread Index and Potential Sudden
Stopsa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The line plots the high-yield-spread index; the shaded area represents potential sudden stops.
Figure 3. Actual and Potential Sudden Stopsa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The line represents actual sudden stops; the shaded area represents potential sudden stops.
Figure 3 shows the relation between potential and actual sudden
stops. The index of actual sudden stops in emerging markets is based
on the definition of Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) and is discussed
more fully in section 4. As the figure illustrates, while many actual
sudden stops occurred during the period of turmoil in emerging markets
in 1998–99, fewer occurred in 2001–2002, when the index of potential
crises indicates a high level of external pressure. This less-than-perfect
correlation between actual and potential sudden stops is not a problem
for the analysis that follows. First, to classify exchange rate regimes, it
is more important to identify a plausible exogenous shock than to
explain all sudden stops. Second, we are interested in explaining when
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the common high-yield-spread shock becomes a country-specific sudden
stop. The fact that the relation between high yield spreads and sudden
stops exhibits some variation allows us to investigate which factors
can account for this. In particular, the increased adoption of flexible
exchange rates has been associated with increased insurance against
potential external crises (see section 4).
2.1 Data
All our analyses use monthly data from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The nominal exchange rate is the monthly end-of-period bilateral dollar
exchange rate (source: IFS line ae). Reserves are measured using gross
foreign exchange reserves minus gold (source: IFS line 1L.d). Regarding
nominal interest rates, we follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in using
policy interest rates whenever possible. As these vary by country, we
use interbank rates for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand
(source: IFS line 60B), deposit rates for Chile (source: IFS line 60L),
discount rates for Colombia and Peru (source: IFS line 60). and Treasury
bill rates for Israel and the Philippines (source: IFS line 60C).
The sample was chosen to include emerging economies that are
sufficiently developed so as to have access to capital flows, so that they
face the open economy policy dilemmas described above. In particular,
we only incorporate countries that are included in the Morgan Stanley
Capital International (MSCI) index.9 In contrast to Calvo and Reinhart
(2002), we consider only the period starting in 1990 because this is
when voluntary capital flows to these economies become substantial.
We exclude the transition economies because they experienced shocks
and reforms of a very different nature in the 1990s. We further limit our
analyses to exchange rate regimes with some de jure exchange rate
flexibility, so that we include only regimes classified as managed floating
or independent floating as reported to the IMF. Finally, we exclude
regimes with severe macroeconomic instability since the macroeconomic
issues are very different for economies with high inflation.10 For each
9. J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) is probably a better-
known index for emerging markets, but it has frequently changed the sample
definitions. We therefore focused on the MSCI to define the sample used here.
10. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) assign these regimes to a separate category of
“freely falling” in their de facto analysis, arguing that floating exchange rates are
qualitatively different under very high inflation.
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episode, we exclude the three months before and after any explicit
change of exchange rate regime to avoid contaminating the results
with transition effects.
2.2 Stylized Facts
We first use the measure of exchange rate flexibility described above
to discuss the unconditional fear of floating described in the literature.
We compute the relative frequencies of large exchange rate movements
and large policy changes and plot them in figure 4. In particular we
plot on the horizontal axis the sample probability that the nominal
exchange rate remains within the band, which is a measure of exchange
rate stability, and on the vertical axis the sample probability that the
instruments remain within the band as a measure of instrument
volatility. The volatility of policy instruments is a weighted average of
the volatility of the nominal interest rate and the volatility of reserves,
using the variance of each instrument’s volatility as weights.
Figure 4. Fear of Floating: The Unconditional Evidencea
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The horizontal axis plots the sample probability that the nominal exchange rate remains within the band, a
measure of exchange rate stability; the vertical axis plots the sample probability that the instruments remain
within the band as a measure of instrument stability.
To interpret the diagram, it is useful to consider the slope of the
line connecting each point to the origin as a measure of exchange
rate flexibility. The steeper the slope the more volatile the exchange
rate relative to the policy instruments. Movements along a ray toward
the origin represent more volatility in both the exchange rate and
policy instruments, without changing the relative volatility of either;
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these movements can thus be interpreted as a measure of the shocks
with which exchange policy had to contend during the sample period.
The diagram includes Australia, which Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
use as a benchmark floating economy.11
Fear of floating can clearly be observed in this figure, although it is
far from uniform as a de facto characterization of emerging market
floating exchange rates. According to this crude measure of exchange
rate flexibility, few emerging markets have exchange rate regimes that
are more flexible than Australia. Only Brazil and the newly independent
floating regimes of Chile, Indonesia, and Thailand appear to have more
flexibility. Mexico and South Africa, which have a similar policy stance
to Australia, appear to face more volatile external conditions. At the
other extreme, Pakistan and India behave very similarly to pegs.
Drawing policy implications from this diagram is difficult, however,
as it is not possible to determine the circumstances that led to these policy
choices. To address this question, we need to compare exchange rate
flexibility across periods with and without external pressure. Table 1
presents the evidence on the flexibility of the exchange rate and instruments,
controlling for whether the country is faced by external pressure. We
estimated the effects by running a regression of a binary variable (which
takes a value of one if the variable is within the band and zero otherwise)
and our indicator of periods of external pressure. This procedure is equivalent
to comparing the probability that each variable is within the relevant
band in periods with and without external pressure. We use this evidence
to explore the extent to which there are emerging markets that are not
characterized by fear of floating and, among those that are, to look for
signs of state-contingent flexibility in the face of external pressure.
Figure 5 presents this data in a diagram, with a combined measure
of instrument volatility as used in figure 1. Again the slope of the line
connecting each point to the origin can be interpreted as exchange rate
flexibility. The two panels compare exchange rate flexibility under the
base case with that when the country faces external pressure. Two
findings stand out from this diagram. First, this analysis appears to
confirm that Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, and Thailand are characterized
by more exchange rate flexibility under the normal circumstances of
the base case. These countries are not accurately characterized by fear
of floating. Second, the figure provides evidence of state-contingent
11. They argue that unlike the G-3, which are not useful comparators for
emerging markets because their currencies are held as international reserves,
Australia has a freely floating policy and is subject to similar external shocks to
many emerging markets.
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flexibility for some countries. In particular, both South Africa and Mexico
exhibit similar flexibility to Australia during normal times but have a
higher degree of flexibility during periods of external pressure.




Under the interpretation of figures 4 and 5, the flexibility of the
exchange rate changes in periods of external pressure if and only if the
slope of the line connecting each point to the origin changes. Figure 6
develops a simple way of testing this hypothesis. We define exchange rate


















The exchange rate regime is more flexible under external pressure
if and only if FB > FG, which can be written, after taking logarithms




   ln Policy_in_band Shock ln Policy_in_band No_shock
ln NER_in_band Shock ln NER_in_band No_shock






Figure 6. Contingent Flexibility: High-Yield-Spread Shocksa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The figure plots (in logs) the change of the policy response against the change in the nominal exchange rate
response. Points above the diagonal represent countries that are more flexible during periods of external pressure;
points below the diagonal exhibit the opposite behavior.
Figure 6 thus plots the change (in logs) of the policy response against
the change in the nominal exchange rate response. Points above the
diagonal represent countries that are more flexible during periods of
external pressure, while points below the diagonal exhibit the opposite
behavior. Many countries are located on or around the diagonal,
suggesting that these countries do not exhibit much state contingency.
Some of these countries, such as Chile, present high levels of flexibility
in both normal and shock periods, while others, as Pakistan, present
low levels of flexibility in both situations. Argentina, Brazil, the more
recent Colombian regime, South Africa, Israel, and Mexico exhibit some
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state-contingency. A few countries, such as India, Indonesia, and
Thailand, lie below the diagonal, suggesting that these countries pursue
more flexible policies in normal times than in periods of external pressure.
However, while this is potentially another form of fear of floating, Thailand
and Indonesia are being compared to a relatively high base level of
flexibility, so this interpretation is not necessarily appropriate. Finally,
Australia is also included in this figure as a falsification exercise. HYS
shocks should not have a significant effect on Australia, so we would not
expect to observe any difference in flexibility during periods of external
pressure. This is exactly what we observe.
In summary, the figures suggest two basic findings. First, the
unconditional data include several countries that exhibit less fear of
floating than the Australia benchmark. Second, a few countries exhibit
fear of floating, but on average allow more exchange rate flexibility
during periods of external pressure. South Africa, in particular, stands
out in this regard. Contingent flexibility also seems to be an aspect of
exchange rate behavior in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Argentina
similarly appears to fall in this category, but it is not clear whether the
increased flexibility is a result of choice or necessity.12
3. EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY INDEX: TIME-SERIES
ANALYSIS
To further support the claims developed above, we undertook a more
formal analysis of exchange rate flexibility. We constructed a time-
series index of flexibility analogous to that presented in Calvo and













2 denotes the variance of the nominal exchange rate,σ ˘ R
2 the
variance of reserves, and
2
i σ the variance of the interest rate. To implement
the measure, we construct at each point in time t a thirteen-month rolling
window centered on t and compute the sample variance of each component
variable. We thus derive a time series measure of exchange rate flexibility.
The interpretation of this indicator is similar to the analysis above. To
evaluate the degree of flexibility of an exchange rate regime, we
12. The analysis in section 3 finds that the apparent state contingency is not
statistically significant.
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incorporate information about the flexibility of both the exchange rate
and policy instruments. More flexible regimes should display a high degree
of exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis instrument volatility and, hence, a
high value of F, while less flexible regimes should register a flexibility
index of close to 0. We use a symmetric window incorporating both leads
and lags of each variable, since we want to evaluate the effect of a shock
by comparing the exchange rate and policies before and after the event.
Before we implemented the analysis, we corrected the index for two
sources of bias in cross-country comparisons. The unconditional average
of the index for each country was regressed against dummy variables for
the index rate series used to control for the fact that some countries use
more volatile market interest rates, while other countries employ a more
stable policy interest rate series. A further potential source of bias arises
from the fact that the floating exchange rate might be more volatile for
some countries than others owing to different terms-of-trade shocks. We
therefore added a variable measuring the volatility of terms-of-trade
shocks to the regression. The index of exchange rate flexibility was then
corrected with the coefficients from this cross-country regression.
For each episode (that is, for each regime included in the analysis),






















as the long-run basis regime effect (that is, when there is no external

















as the long-run difference in the flexibility index between normal and
(potential) crises times. We use the Schwarz information criterion to
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choose the optimal lag structure of the model. Table 2 presents a
summary of the results of these regressions.
The results of this analysis mostly confirm the less formal stylized
facts presented in section 2, although we discuss some important
differences below. Regimes are classified as contingent (C), noncontingent
(NC) and discretionary (D) according to the following algorithm. The
coefficients for the long-run base effect and contingent flexibility are
calculated from the time-series analysis. The contingent regimes are
















is significantly different from zero at 5 percent significance according
to a Wald test. The other two regimes are distinguished based on a
comparison of the base level of flexibility with two benchmark floating








for a regime is significantly less than that of Australia or Singapore for
the same time period (on the basis of a one-tailed Wald test), then the
regime is classified as discretionary (fear of floating).13 Otherwise, it is
classified as noncontingent floating.
This algorithm produces a classification similar to the picture obtained
in figure 4. Table 2 suggests that only four countries, Brazil, Colombia
(after 1999), South Africa, and Mexico exhibit contingent flexibility. 14
South Africa apparently exhibits a high degree of base-line flexibility
that is not statistically different from either Australia or Singapore,
suggesting its contingent flexible is in addition to a flexible exchange
rate. The other three contingent regimes exhibit significantly less
flexibility than the benchmarks in the base case, suggesting that there
13. Although the base-level coefficient for Australia is less than that for
Singapore, the sample for each significance test differences according to the dates
of each regime. It is thus necessary to carry out both tests in each case.
14. The statistical analysis does not identify Argentina as a member of this
group, despite appearances to the contrary in figure 5.
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are indeed circumstances in which exchange rate rigidity is desirable
provided that it does not undermine insurance. The other regimes do not
exhibit contingency, but they do exhibit significant differences in
flexibility. The regimes classified as discretionary exhibit fear of floating
in all states of nature. These countries show an apparent inability to
commit to floating exchange rates. The countries in the sample classified
as discretionary are Argentina, Chile (before 1999), Colombia (before
1999)15, India, Pakistan, Peru, and the Philippines. Finally the
noncontingent, flexible regimes are Chile (after 1999), Indonesia, Israel,
and Thailand. Australia and Singapore would also be considered members
of this category, but they were defined as such for the purposes of
categorizing the other regimes.
4. THE BENEFITS OF A COMMITMENT TO A FLOAT
The above discussion classified regimes with state-contingent policies.
Interpreting the classification, however, requires an understanding of
the extent to which the choice of exchange rate regime is associated with
insurance against external shocks This question can be addressed on
two separate levels. The interpretation of exchange rate behavior is
complicated by the fact that, as discussed in Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2004), alternative insurance mechanisms are available that can
substitute for exchange rate flexibility, such as capital controls, reserve
requirements, and sterilization of capital inflows. We first examine the
extent to which our classification of discretionary regimes can actually
be characterized more generally as uninsured regimes by investigating
these substitutes. Nevertheless, examining policies alone is not sufficient
to determine that the choice of exchange rate regime is important. Thus,
we proceed to examine the extent to which floating exchange rates are
associated with improved insurance against external shocks in terms of
outcomes. We examine two pieces of evidence: the relation between sudden
stops and the exchange rate regime, and the dynamics of private holdings
of foreign exchange reserves.
Table 3 accounts for other substitute insurance policies. Controlling
capital inflows directly can prevent the underinsurance from arising,
but at the cost of limiting integration with international capital markets.
15. Although the statistical analysis did not select Colombia (before 1999) as
significantly less flexible than either Australia or Singapore, the regime was
qualitatively very similar to Chile (before 1999) and was classified accordingly as
discretionary.
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Capital controls are measured according to the index in Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2003). Capital controls are clearly more prevalent in
countries with discretionary regimes, suggesting that this policy
substitutes for exchange rate flexibility. Nevertheless, capital controls
are an extremely suboptimal response to the underinsurance problem
in that they provide insurance only at the expense of isolation from
international capital markets.
Table 3. Substitute Insurance Mechanisms
Capital Quality of Reserve
Country controlsa Sterilizationb bank supervisionc requirementsd
Contingent regimes
Brazil 1.8 0.11 3.0 16.4
Colombia (after 1999) 1.0 –1.15 2.0 12.7
Mexico 1.0 –0.67 2.0 15.7
South Africa 2.1 0.18 3.0 11.4
Average 1.5 –0.38 2.5 14.1
Median 1.4 –0.28 2.5 14.2
Noncontingent (floating)
Chile (1999-) 1.0 –0.53 3.0 12.7
Indonesia 3.0 –0.91 n.a. n.a
Israel 1.5 –1.14 2.5 9.5
Singapore 1.5 –0.83 3.5 18.4
Thailand 1.1 –0.84 3.0 11.4
Average 1.6 –0.85 3.0 13.1
Median 1.5 –0.84 3.0 12.1
Discretionary (fear of floating)
Argentina 3.0 –0.60 2.0 8.8
Colombia (before 1999) 2.2 –0.78 2.0 12.7
Chile (before 1999) 2.0 –0.23 3.0 12.7
India 3.0 –0.26 2.0 11.9
Pakistan 3.0 –1.14 1.0 8.8
Peru 1.1 –0.57 3.0 12.8
Philippines 2.5 0.21 2.5 14.5
Average 2.4 –0.48 2.2 11.7
Median 2.5 –0.57 2.0 12.7
Source: Author’s compilation; see notes.
n.a. Not available.
a. Capital controls index is from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003). A value of 3 equals high controls; 1 equals low
or no controls;
b. Update of the results from Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2001). The estimate corresponds to the coefficient
of the change in net foreign assets in a regression of the change in net domestic assets on net foreign assets and
lagged net domestic assets. Monthly data from IFS, lines 11 to 17.
c. Computed using the definition in Abiad and Mody (2003), with data from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). A
value of 4 equals best quality; 0 equals worst quality. The index incorporates information on banks’ adoption of
a capital adequacy regulation in line with standards developed by the Bank for International Settlements;
whether the supervisory agency is independent from executive influence and whether it has sufficient legal
power and (material) supervisory power; the absence of exemptions to mandatory actions if an infraction is
observed; and the extent to which supervision covers all financial institutions.
d. From Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). The actual risk-adjusted capital ratio in banks is as of year-end 2001,
using the 1988 Basle Accord definitions.
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The second policy option suggested by Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2004) is sterilization of capital inflows. Although the efficacy of such a
policy has been questioned, our goal here is simply to examine the facts.
We use the methodology of Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2001) to
evaluate the importance of sterilized interventions, We run the following
regression for each country using monthly data for the relevant period
for each regime:
() ()( ) 1 NDA NFA NDA t tt t − Δ= α + β Δ + γ Δ + ε ,
where NDA represents the net domestic assets of the monetary
authority and NFA is net foreign assets. With full sterilization, we
expect β to be equal to –1, and with partial sterilization β should be
less than 0 but greater than –1. This regression is a very crude
measure of sterilization that may suffer from biases related to omitted
variables and potential endogeneity, so we focus on comparing the
estimates across groups, rather than on the estimated levels. The
second column of table 3 presents estimates of β for each regime.
This evidence is less clear. The results suggest that while
discretionary regimes use sterilization, suggesting a further
substitute insurance mechanism, noncontingent floating regimes do
so even more. It appears that as the floating exchange rate gains
credibility, sterilization becomes a complementary rather than a
substitute policy. State-contingent regimes, which can be associated
with higher levels of credibility, sterilize least of all, suggesting that
once credibility has been gained, it is no longer necessary to
complement floating with additional policies.
Finally, we present measures of financial regulation from Abiad
and Mody (2003) and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). Better
supervision and prudential regulation can monitor balance sheet
mismatches and help prevent the build up of excessive dollar
liabilities. At the same time, better-functioning and well-developed
financial markets increase the stock of assets that can be presented
as collateral. Table 3 shows that financial development does not
substitute for flexible exchange rates—in fact, it is the opposite. The
least liberalized financial markets are found in countries with
discretionary regimes. Although the differences are small, the most
liberalized financial markets are found among the state-contingent
regimes. In sum, we find some weak evidence that discretionary
regimes undertake alternative policies to insure themselves against
external shocks. Policies such as capital controls can be very costly,
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however, and they are unlikely to be superior to a well-managed
open economy with flexible exchange rates.
The next results examine the extent to which the choice of exchange
rate regime, in particular flexibility during potential crises, is associated
with better insurance outcomes. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004)
argue that better insurance occurs through the mechanism of altering
private sector incentives to conserve international liquidity. Although
such a proposition is difficult to test directly, some evidence in this
direction is provided in table 4, which presents regression results that
link the exchange rate regime to the international liquidity held by
domestic residents in banks. Two specifications are estimated, with
and without lags of the dependent variable for absolute and relative
measures of private reserves:
Table 4. Private Reserve Accumulation and the Exchange
Rate Regimea
Dependent and explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: private reserves
Log(GDP) 1.426** 1.398*** 0.050*** 0.051***
(0.016) (0.704) (0.294) (0.016)
F 0.375*** 0.449*** 0.013*** 0.010
(0.044) (0.075) (0.005) (0.008)
HYS 0.182* –0.002
(0.114) (0.007)




Dependent variable: share of private reserves in total reserves
Log(GDP) 0.046 0.049 –0.040*** –0.042***
(0.123) (0.121) (0.014) (0.013)
F 0.022** 0.020 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003)
HYS 0.019 0.009
(0.030) (0.007)
F *HYS –0.001 0.002
(0.020) (0.004)
[PR / (PR + PuR)]t–1 0.413*** 0.411***
(0.057) (0.057)
No. countries 14 14 14 14
No. observations 1,280 1,280 1,274 1,274
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
* Statistically significant at  the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at  the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at  the 1 percent level.
a. Fixed-effect estimates. Standard errors (robust to clusters at the country level) are in parentheses.
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In these equations, i represents the country, t represents the month,
PR represents private reserves as measured by international liquid
assets in banks (source: IFS), PuR represents the international reserves
held by the Central Bank as used in previous sections (source: IFS),
GDP represents GDP in dollars (source: IFS), F is the (corrected)
flexibility index used above, and HYS is the index of (potential) crises
developed above. Country dummies are also included. As can be observed
in table 4, there is a robust relation between private reserves and
exchange rate flexibility, both in absolute terms and as a share of the
total reserves of the country. As flexibility increases, the private sector
hoards more dollar reserves. The interaction term is not significant, so
it is exchange rate flexibility per se that is important and not just
flexibility during crises.
The second set of regressions investigates the link between exchange
rate flexibility and sudden stops. The hypothesis underlying these
regressions is that the high-yield-spread series that we have used for
classifying exchange rate regimes is a common external shock. Whether
such a shock develops into a sudden stop depends on how insured the
country is and, in particular, the dollar reserves on which it can draw
during such an episode. To investigate this hypothesis, it is necessary
to define sudden stops. The series constructed is based on Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004), with the series updated to 2003. Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) define a sudden stop as a phase that meets
the following two conditions: it contains at least one observation where
the year-on-year fall in capital flows lies at least two standard deviations
below its sample mean; and the phase ends once the annual change in
capital flows exceeds one standard deviation below its sample mean.
The beginning of a sudden stop is determined by the first time the
annual change in capital flows falls one standard deviation below the
mean. The appendix presents a complete list of the sudden stops identified
by this methodology. We estimate the following equation:
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SUDDEN HYS HYS * it t it t it i it FF =α+β +χ +δ +μ +ε ,
where SUDDEN is a dummy taking the value of one if there is an
(actual) sudden stop and zero otherwise. F is the (corrected) flexibility
index described above, and the HYS is the a dummy taking the value of
one if there is a (potential) external crisis, as defined above. Random or
fixed country-specific effects are included in some specifications.
Table 5 shows the results of estimating the equation described
above with a probit model, a linear probability model, and a logit
model (without country effects, with country fixed effects, and with
country random effects).16 In all cases, the coefficient of the interaction
term is negative and significant. Exchange rate flexibility during a
potential crisis significantly reduces the probability that the shock
will develop into a sudden stop. In the three models, the marginal
effect of increasing flexibility from 0 to 1 during a crisis is to reduce
the probability of a sudden stop by between 7.9 percent and 12.2
percent, which is quantitatively large in comparison with the average
sample probability of a sudden stop during a potential (12.4 percent).17
It is the interaction, not the main effect, which is significantly
negative. Thus, from the point of view of insurance against sudden
stops, it is only the commitment to floating during periods of external
financial pressure that leads to better protection.
We now link this analysis with the earlier discrete classifications
of exchange rate regimes. The crisis dummy is intended to pick up
only one plausible source of exogenous external pressure, to enable
the classification of exchange rate regimes. Likewise, the results in
table 5 measure the extent to which that same source of external
pressure (which is a common shock) converts into a sudden stop
(which is a country-specific outcome). If the classification is valid,
there should be a significant relation between the regime
classification and the likelihood of being subject to a sudden stop,
even if that sudden stop were not associated with a high-yield-spread
16. Fixed-effect estimates using the probit model with panel data are severely
biased owing to the incidental parameters problem (Wooldrige, 2002), so we do not
present them.
17. In the case of the logit model with fixed effects, five countries (710
observations) were dropped because all outcomes were negative (that is, these
countries did not have sudden stops during the period). In this case, the marginal
effect of moving the flexibility index from 0 to 1 is –27.9 percent, which is a large
magnitude considering that the probability that these countries will have a sudden
stop during a crisis is 16.8 percent.
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shock on which we have focused. Table 6 addresses this question. It
illustrates the sudden stops that occurred during the sample period
and the exchange rate regime according to the classification in table
2. The link between exchange rate regimes and sudden stops appears
to hold generally. In particular, sudden stops only occurred in
countries with discretionary regimes.
Table 6. Country Episodes and Sudden Stops
Sudden stop No sudden stop
Country Regime Country Regime
Colombia (before 1999) Discretionary Argentina Discretionary
Chile (before 1999) Discretionary Brazil Contingent
Peru Discretionary Chile (after 1999) Noncontingent










5. DETERMINANTS OF STATE-CONTINGENT REGIMES
Emerging market exchange rate regimes vary considerably, and
this variation is associated with important differences in the extent to
which countries are insured against external shocks. What determines
the choice of exchange rate regime? If the benefits of floating and, in
particular, state-contingent regimes are so clear, why is fear of floating
so pervasive? Our analysis suggests that an important obstacle to
floating is the need to develop credibility for the exchange rate regime.
This section examines two hypotheses—that the exchange rate regime
is related systematically to the overall credibility of the monetary policy
framework, and that credibility takes time to acquire, so that contingent
floating is more likely to be found among countries that have a longer
experience with a floating exchange rate regime than among countries
that have recently implemented a float.
Table 7 tests these hypotheses. Monetary policy credibility is
measured by the commitment to inflation targeting. We measure
inflation targeting using the classification developed by Carare and
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Stone (2003), which identifies countries that have implemented full-
fledged inflation targeting regimes. They characterize such countries
as those having a medium to high level of credibility, a clear
commitment to their inflation target, and an institutionalization of
this commitment in the form of a transparent monetary framework
that fosters the accountability of the central bank. This measure fits
particularly well our notion of inflation credibility. The table shows
that this measure of credibility lines up with the theoretical analysis
in section 1. State-contingent regimes are more likely to have high
levels of monetary policy credibility, noncontingent floating regimes
are intermediate, and the regimes with the lowest degree of credibility
exhibit, in general, discretionary fear of floating.
With regard to the time to acquire credibility for floating, the
table does not exhibit very clear results. Among the floating regimes,
the unconditional average age of noncontingent regimes is only slightly
less than that of contingent regimes. However, regime
misclassifications might be weakening these results. In particular,
Brazil and Colombia (after 1999) switched to more flexible regimes
following a sudden stop, and they are classified as involuntary
transitions according to the index developed by the IMF (2004). Both
countries have avoided suffering additional external crises, but it is
perhaps too early to tell whether they are floating out of choice or
necessity. Israel was a borderline case in the classification, as it
exhibited a quantitatively large coefficient in the measure of state
contingency that was nevertheless statistically insignificant. In line
with the hypothesis, Chile and Indonesia are more recent entrants to
the group of floating exchange rates. On the other hand, the state-
contingent regimes contain some of the most experienced emerging
market floaters, including Mexico and South Africa. This analysis
must be considered an ex post rationalization, however, so the
hypothesis remains only weakly proven.
The table also includes a measure of derivatives market
development, based on data from the Bank for International
Settlements. Some researchers argue that the development of
derivatives markets fosters the development of exchange rate flexibility,
by enabling the allocation of exchange rate risk to those most able to
bear it and by fostering a more sophisticated approach to financial
risk management. Such instruments might also substitute for
contingency in policies and hence aid the transition to floating exchange
rates. The data loosely support this hypothesis. Derivatives market
development is most stunted in countries with discretionary exchange
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Table 7. Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes
Regime and Inflation Voluntary Agec Derivatives
country targetinga regime market
changeb developmentd
Contingent regimes
Brazil 0.9 0.0 62 0.9
Colombia (after 1999) 1.0 0.0 61 0.3
Mexico 0.6 0.0 103 1.5
South Africa 0.3 1.0 180 13.5
Average 0.7 0.3 101.5 4.1
Median 0.8 0.0 82.5 1.2
Noncontingent (floating)
Chile (after 1999) 1.0 1.0 62 2.2
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 67 n.a.
Israel 0.6 1.0 96 0.9
Singapore 0.0 1.0 180 258.6
Thailand 0.5 0.0 83 3.9
Average 0.4 0.6 97.6 66.4
Median 0.5 1.0 83.0 3.1
Discretionary (“fear of floating”)
Argentina 0.0 0.0 29 0.1
Chile (before 1999) 0.1 1.0 110 1.7
Colombia (before 1999) 0.0 1.0 111 0.0
India 0.0 1.0 180 n.a.
Pakistan 0.0 1.0 180 n.a.
Peru 0.0 0.0 132 n.a.
Philippines 0.0 0.0 112 n.a.
Average 0.0 0.6 122.0 0.6
Median 0.0 1.0 112.0 0.1
Source: Authors’ compilation; see notes.
a. The percentage of time in each regime that a full-fledged inflation-targeting regime has been in operation.
Source: Carare and Stone (2003).
b. A voluntary transition is a transition that is not driven by a crisis. Crisis-driven transitions are defined as
those that are associated with a depreciation of more than 20 percent vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, a doubling (or
more) in the depreciation rate of  the previous year, and depreciation in the previous year of less than 40 percent.
Source: IMF (2004).
c. Age is defined as the number of months that the country was under the regime until the end of the regime
(defined in table 2) and that the regime was not classified as a de facto free-falling regime by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004).
d. Foreign exchange derivatives transactions to GDP. Source: BIS (1999, 2002).
rate regimes. Comparisons between the contingent and noncontingent
floating regimes are harder to make, as there are few data points and
several significant outliers. Furthermore, it is impossible to ascertain
whether derivatives markets foster flexible exchange rates, flexible
exchange rates foster derivatives markets, or both developments are
jointly determined by some underlying fundamental cause. As such
this remains a correlation.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
We have reexamined fear of floating from the perspective that
when policymakers in emerging markets determine exchange rate
policy, they face a tradeoff between limiting exchange rate volatility
and allowing the exchange rate to float. Fear of floating might indeed
be the optimal policy for these economies in normal times, because
excess exchange rate volatility is legitimately feared for its effects
on inflation or firm balance sheets. Fear of floating is not always the
optimal policy, however, since a commitment to floating would
improve insurance against potential sudden stops. We have
categorized exchange rate regimes in the light of this framework.
Policymakers with little commitment will only be able to implement
discretionary policies with little exchange rate flexibility, and fear
of floating will be the result. With intermediate levels of commitment,
floating during crises will be feasible, but noncontingent policies must
be used to demonstrate the commitment to floating. Finally with
full commitment, the optimal regime is state contingent—floating
during (potential) crises, but retaining the option to intervene, if
necessary, on other occasions.
With this framework in mind, we explored the empirical evidence
on exchange rate flexibility in emerging markets. We covered some of
the same ground as Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in their original paper
on fear of floating, although we found much evidence that the picture is
significantly more complicated than this one-dimensional
characterization. There is indeed a lot of fear of floating in emerging
markets, as Calvo and Reinhart found, but our analysis of state-contingent
flexibility allows us to be more certain both in attributing this to an
inefficient discretionary equilibrium and in arguing that more
commitment to exchange rate flexibility would be beneficial for insuring
these economies against sudden stops. These economies seem to choose
to control capital flows rather than undertake any substitute insurance
policies in the context of open capital markets, and the overall credibility
of their monetary policy frameworks tends to be low.
At the same time, we found several emerging markets that are
not characterized by fear of floating at all. Chile and Indonesia—two
recent converts to floating—appear to be serious about developing a
reputation for floating, and they are forgoing exchange rate intervention
to demonstrate this. In accordance with the theoretical analysis, these
economies can be characterized as having intermediate levels of
credibility. Other analyses have also highlighted the exchange rate
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flexibility of these economies. Hernández and Montiel (2001) identify
Indonesia as the only Asian country to move to free-floating following
the crisis, and Frankel (2003) presents Indonesia as a successful
floating exchange rate, given its subsequent recovery despite being
hit with the worst of the Asian crisis.
Finally we found that several of the more mature floating
exchange rates exhibit precisely the state-contingent flexibility that
our theoretical analysis suggests would be optimal in this
environment. They appear to be able to intervene under certain
circumstances without compromising their commitment to floating
during potential sudden stops, when floating is really important.
Such economies exhibit high levels of monetary policy credibility.
The clearest examples of such countries that emerge from our
analysis are South Africa and Mexico.18 These two countries were
more or less able to isolate their economies from the periods of extreme
external turbulence in the late 1990s. For instance, both countries
allowed big movements in the nominal exchange rate in the late
1990s, and neither had sudden stops in that period (Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Mejía, 2004). Moreover, their decline in growth rates were quite
mild in comparison with other countries.
The South African case presents a particularly interesting study
for emerging market floating regimes. It is an open middle-income
country that experienced seven currency crises between the end of
the Bretton Woods system and 1985 (Bordo and Eichengreen, 2002),
which is high even by current standards of emerging market volatility.
Since 1985, however, South Africa has applied a floating regime, and
its commitment to this regime does not appear to be in doubt.19 The
South African Reserve Bank has explicitly stated that it does not target
the level of the exchange rate, although it has a policy of intervening
to “smooth out large short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate”
(Mboweni, 2004). The commitment to floating has clearly been tested
on several recent occasions, yet South Africa did not experience a
sudden stop despite the turmoil in emerging markets (Calvo, Izquierdo,
18. South Africa is perhaps a more appropriate benchmark than Australia,
which is the usual comparator for emerging market exchange rate regimes. The
particular financial market shocks on which we have focused clearly have an
impact on South Africa, while they have no impact on the Australian exchange
rate regime, indicating that they probably do not represent external shocks at all.
19. It is one of the few emerging markets that the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
classification reports as a freely floating exchange rate. It is classified as such
starting in 1995, prior to which it is classified as a managed float.
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and Mejía, 2004). It appears that a floating exchange rate is not only a
feasible policy for emerging markets, but one that can be successfully
used to insure the economy against external volatility without forgoing
the option of occasionally intervene in turbulent markets. For more recent
floaters such as Chile, this experience should prove an invaluable guide.
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APPENDIX
Sudden Stops by Country and Period
This appendix presents our sample of sudden stops, which we
calculated using the updated Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004)
methodology. This sample is used in figure 3 and section 4.
— Argentina: September 1994 to December 1995; February 1999 to
December 1999; January 2001 to September 2002.
— Brazil: October 1997 to June 1999.
— Chile: June 1998 to June 1999.
— Colombia: July 1998 to June 2000.
— India: none.
— Indonesia: June 1997 to September 1998.
— Israel: none.
— Mexico: January 1994 to March 1995.
— Pakistan: none.
— Peru: September 1997 to December 1998.
— Philippines: September 1991 to June 1992; June 1997 to June 1999.
— Singapore: none.
— South Africa: none.
— Thailand: July 1996 to September 1998.
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